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Abstract 
In this lecture we consider bimatrix game with fuzzy payoff. We define the concept of correlated equilibrium and we investigate 
the relation between this concept and the Nash equilibrium strategy concept defined by Maeda (2003).  
In game theory, a correlated equilibrium is a solution concept that is more general than the well-known Nash equilibrium. It was 
first discussed by Aumann (1974). The idea is that each player chooses his action according to his observation of the value of the 
same public signal. A strategy assigns an action to every possible observationa player can make. A joint distribution ʌ is defined 
to be a correlated equilibrium if no player can ever expect to unilaterally gain by deviating from his recommendation, assuming 
the other players play according to their recommendations. The set of correlated equilibria is a convex polytope, described by 
finitely explicit linear inequalities  
Since in our case the elements of payoff matrices are fuzzy numbers, the expected payoff of the game should be fuzzy-valued. 
There are not concept of equilibrium strategy to be accepted widely. So, it is an important task to define the concepts of 
equilibrium strategies and investigate their properties. In this presentation, we define the concept of Į-correlated equilibrium by 
using the concept of Į– Nash equilibrium defined by Maeda in 2003.  
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